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NOTES
THE GOVERNMENT ALWAYS WINS: THE GOVERNMENT
CAN NOW RECOVER CERTAIN OVERSIGHT COSTS UNDER
CERCLA § 107
United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Company, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Hazardous waste sites pose numerous problems to humans and the
environment if they are not decontaminated. One example is the Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska in 1989.2 That oil spill,
and others like it, put in danger "ten million migratory shore birds and
waterfowl, hundreds of sea otters, dozens of other species, such as harbor
porpoises and sea lions, and several varieties of whales."3  Another
infamous example of a hazardous waste site4 is Love Canal, "where
hazardous chemicals were poured into a ditch that was covered and over
which was built a school and a number of homes."5  As a result of
disasters such as these, Congress has enacted many statutes over the years
to enable the government, primarily through the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), to perform hazardous waste cleanup or provide
assistance to private parties in hazardous waste cleanup.6 In return for its
assistance, the government has generally been allowed to recover some of
' 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005) ("DuPont lf').
2 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EXXON VALDEZ,
http://www.epa.gov/oilspill/exxon.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2006). The Exxon Valdez oil spill was
the largest in U.S. history and resulted in more than eleven million gallons of crude oil in Prince
William Sound, Alaska. Id.
Id.
4 "[O]ne by-product of American industrial development is an unfortunate legacy of environmental
contamination, involving hundreds of hazardous chemical substances disposed of at thousands of
sites across the United States. Susan M. Cooke, The Law of Hazardous Waste: Management,
Cleanup, Liability, and Litigation, § 12.01[1] (1993). Experience suggests that it will take decades
of effort and billions of dollars to clean up the nation's hazardous waste sites to levels that are
deemed acceptable by governmental regulators and the public." Id.
5 Id. at § 12.02[2]. As a result of the toxic wastes buried under the school and homes, resident
suffered from "liver abnormalities, skin sores, rectal bleeding, birth defects, miscarriages, and
epilepsy." Id.
6 See infra note 25 for examples of such statutes.
241
MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 3
its costs incurred during the cleanup process under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").
However, until DuPont II was decided, the government had not been
allowed to recover oversight costs relating to a removal action. As the
saying goes, the government always wins. Thus, in the Third Circuit at
least, the government may now recover its oversight costs relating to a
removal action.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Appellees E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company ("DuPont")7 and
Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corporation have owned and operated the
DuPont NewPort Superfund Site8 at various times over the years.9 In the
1980's the site was identified as a "potential threat to human health." 0 As
a result, in February 1990, the site was placed on CERCLA's National
Priorities List ("NPL")." In an attempt to remedy the situation, the EPA
"developed a remedial action plan . . . and issued a unilateral
administrative order directing DuPont to remediate the site in the manner
set forth in the remedial action plan."' 2 Following the EPA order, DuPont
developed a "private party cleanup action." 3 This action consisted of two
stages: first, the "removal action," developing project specifications and
7 The two appellees will be referred to together as DuPont.
8 The DuPont NewPort Superfund Site is an industrial site in Delaware. DuPont II, 432 F.3d at
163. It is approximately 120 acres in size. United States. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co.,
2004 WL 1812704 at * 1 (D. Del. Aug. 5, 2004) ("DuPont 1). The site includes "a paint pigment
plant, a former chromium dioxide plant, ... two unlined, industrial landfills,... wetlands adjacent
to each landfill, a baseball field..., and a portion of the Christina River." Id.
9 DuPont II, 432 F.3d at 163.
10 Id. The site was "heavily contaminated with various hazardous substances, including heavy
metals such as arsenic, barium, cadmium, lead and zinc, as well as volatile organic compounds
including tetrachloroethene and trichloroethene." DuPont I, 2004 WL 1812704 at *2.
" DuPont II, 432 F.3d at 163. The NPL was first announced in 1983 and is "updated regularly
based on the evaluation of both new sites and the progress of cleanup at sites already on the NPL."
University of Washington, The History of Superfund,
http://depts.washington.edulsfimd/history.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
12 DuPont I, 432 F.3d at 163. The EPA issued the unilateral administrative order because the
government and DuPont could not come to agreement on the implementation. Id. The EPA also
had the authority for oversight and approval. Id. The plan included "excavating and dredging
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schedules; and second, the "remedial action," which was the cleanup
itself.14 DuPont finished the cleanup project both under budget and ahead
of schedule, and the EPA approved the action.' 5 The EPA supervised the
two stages of cleanup,' 6 incurring $1,394,796.94 in oversight costs during
the cleanup process.'
The United States brought suit under CERCLA to recover the
oversight costs from DuPont.' 8 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that CERCLA provides for recovery of "costs incurred in the course
of supervising a hazardous waste cleanup conducted by responsible
private parties."' 9 This decision overruled United States v. Rohm & Haas




Congress enacted CERCLA 22 on December 11, 198023 and President
Jimmy Carter signed it into law.24 For two decades prior to the enactment
14 Id. The cleanup work included "soil excavation, remedial 'cap' construction, groundwater
barrier installation, groundwater monitoring and treatment, and wetland restoration." Id.
15 Id
16 Id. Oversight in the removal stage included "reviewing and approving project specifications,
treatment technologies, testing and sampling methods, and construction schedules." Id. Oversight
in the remedial stage included "monitoring, reviewing, and approving design plan implementation,
construction schedules, health and safety issues, field work, and field change requests." Id.
1 Id. The oversight costs for the removal stage were $746,279.77, and the oversight costs for the
remedial stage were $648,517.17. Id. DuPont spent more than $35,000,000 during the cleanup.
Id. at 177. The EPA also incurred past costs, such as travel and payroll, of $499,803.81. DuPont I,
2004 WL 1812704 at *4. The parties settled this amount. Id.
1 DuPont 11, 432 F.3d at 162.
19 Id
20 2 F.3d 1265 (3rd Cir.. 1993).
2 DuPont II, 432 F.3d at 163.
22 CERCLA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. Congress enacted CERCLA "[iun response to
widespread public concern about the health and environmental threats posed by uncontrolled,
abandoned hazardous waste sites, and the perceived inadequacy of prior environmental laws."
Cooke, supra note 4, at § 12.02[1].
23 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CERCLA OVERVIEW,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/law/cercla.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
24 University of Washington, The History of Superfund,
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of CERCLA, Congress had passed "strong environmental legislation in
recognition of the danger to human health and the environment posed by a
host of environmental pollutants." 25 However, these laws were inadequate
to handle the "massive" problems. 26  Therefore, Congress enacted
CERCLA as "an Act to provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and
emergency response for hazardous substances released into the
environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites."27
Congress believed "those responsible for problems caused by the disposal
of chemical poisons must bear the costs and responsibility for remedying
the harmful conditions they created." 28  CERCLA gives the federal
government authority to address "releases or threatened releases of
hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the
environment." 29
Courts have had trouble interpreting CERCLA because of its "poor
quality of . .. draftsmanship and its unhelpful legislative history."3 o One
court stated, "the 'final version of the Act was conceived by an ad hoc
committee of Senators who finished a last minute compromise which
enabled the Act to pass . . . [therefore,] the statute was hastily and
inadequately drafted."' 31 As a result, courts tend to interpret CERCLA
"broadly and liberally in order to effectuate its remedial purpose with
respect to hazardous waste cleanup and liability." 32  Courts have also
noted that "Congress intended to address the problem of hazardous waste
contamination in general rather than merely specific categories of
http://depts.washington.edu/sfund/history.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
25 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016(I), at 17 (1980). One of these statutes was the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, which provides for "the regulation and control of the generation, treatment and
disposal of hazardous wastes." H.R. REP. No. 96-1016(11), at 3. Other statutes include the Clean
Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act. Cooke supra note 4, at § 12.01 [1].
26 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016(1), at 18. In 1979 the EPA estimated that between 30,000 and 50,000
"inactive and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites" existed and between 1,200 - 2,000 of those
Posed "a serious risk to public health." Id.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510,
94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
2 DuPont II, 432 F.3d at 164 (quoting In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d 201, 206
(3d Cir. 2003).
29 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 23.
30 Cooke, supra note 4, at § 12.03.
31 Id. (quoting United States v. A. & F. Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984)).
32 id
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pollutants, environmental media, and disposal sites." 33
CERCLA has three main functions: to establish requirements for
closed or abandoned hazardous waste sites, provide liability for those
responsible for releasing hazardous waste, and establish a trust fund ("the
Fund" or "Superfund") 34 to pay for cleanup of the hazardous waste sites.35
The Act provides for both short-term removal actions and long-term
remedial actions. 36  DuPont is concerned with CERCLA § 107, which
states in part that owners and operators of a facility are liable for costs
incurred by the United States in removal and remedial actions and other
necessary costs incurred by any other person.37
33 id
34 This trust fund is funded by an excise tax on feedstock chemicals and petroleum. Environment,
Health and Safety Online, http://www.ehso.com/superfund.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
3 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 23.
36 id
3 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This section provides the following:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section--
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for--
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a
release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
245
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B. Summary of Relevant Cases
In the instant decision the court overruled United States v. Rohm &
Haas Co. ("Rohm & Hass"), holding that governmental oversight costs are
recoverable.38 In Rohm & Haas, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that Congress had given no clear indication that governmental
costs were recoverable and the United States was not entitled to
recovery.39 Rohm & Haas centered on the hazardous waste cleanup in
Bristol Township, Pennsylvania. 4 0 The defendant used the site for the
"disposal of general refuse, [to] process wastes, and offgrade products
from [Rohm and Haas'] plastics and chemical manufacturing plants.'
The EPA allowed the defendant to clean the site under the Resource and
Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA") and then sought to recover
oversight costs under CERCLA § 107.42 The court determined that
CERCLA § 107 permitted recovery of costs incurred under other statutes
(such as RCRA).43 However, the court further stated that under the
National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States ("NCTA")44
standard, "there must be a clear congressional intent, reflected in the
language of the statute, to impose upon a party oversight costs incurred by
the EPA."A5 After considering the various sections of CERCLA, the court
found "there is no clear indication in § 107, § 104, the definition of
removal, or § 106 that government oversight actions conducted . .. were
intended to be recoverable removal costs.' 6 As a result, the United States
was not entitled to recover its oversight costs for removal actions.47
NCTA arose after the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") began to impose fees upon community antenna television
48("CATV") systems. The petitioner in the case was a trade association
38 DuPont 11, 432 F.3d at 162.
3 Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1278.
40 Id. at 1268.
41 Id. By 1981, 309,000 tons of waste and 4,600 tons of hazardous substances had been disposed
of at the site. Id.
42 id
43 Id. at 1274.
415 U.S. 336 (1974).
45 Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1273.
4 Id. at 1278.
47 id
48 Nat'1 Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 338-39 (1974) ("NCTA").
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that represented CATV systems.4 9 The trade association opposed the fee
since it was based on the FCC's costs and did not reflect any benefit that
inured to the public.o The Supreme Court held that the fee was calculated
incorrectly and the correct measure of the fee was to be the "value to the
recipient."5
Other cases have examined the NCTA standard as it relates to
recovery of administrative costs. Those courts have generally determined
that the Supreme Court's proposition in NCTA is that "Congress must
indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the discretionary
authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit
of regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether
characterized as 'fees' or 'taxes,' on those parties."52
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. ("Cooper
Industries"),53 the Supreme Court determined that Aviall Services'
interpretation of the word "may" in CERCLA § 113(f)(1) was broader
than the natural meaning of the word.54 Aviall Services brought suit
against Cooper Industries to recover costs Aviall Services incurred in
cleaning up four properties in Texas that had been contaminated with
hazardous substances.55  Cooper Industries owned the properties until
1981, at which time Aviall Services bought them.56 Aviall Services sued
under CERCLA § 113, which allows for contribution from previous
owners.57  The Court determined that proper statutory interpretation
involves the natural meaning of the term.58  In addition, if terms are
interpreted outside their natural meaning, they can make other terms
explicitly used superfluous, which the Court is "loath to do."59 The Court
4 Id. at 337-38.
so See generally id. at 336-40.
51 Id. at 342-43.
52 Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224
(1989)).
" 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
54 Id. at 165-66.
s Id. at 157.
56 Id.
57 id
58 Id. at 166.
5 Id. "There is no reason why Congress would bother to specify conditions under which a person
may bring a contribution claim and at the same time allow contribution actions absent those
conditions." Id.
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also noted that, while both parties claimed the purpose of CERCLA was in
their favor, "'[i]t is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."' 60
These and other cases suggest that the government is not entitled to
recover for costs incurred unless Congress has clearly intended it to be
able to do so. In addition, statutes are to be interpreted narrowly and terms
are to be given their natural meaning. The DuPont II majority has
therefore chosen to reject prior case law in its determination that the
government is entitled to recover its oversight costs.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The majority held that CERCLA provides for governmental
recovery of oversight costs.61 In reaching this decision, the majority first
discussed the history and purpose of CERCLA.62  One purpose of
particular importance to the majority is that the parties who create
hazardous waste should be expected to pay for the hazardous waste
cleanup.63 As part of the analysis to determine whether CERCLA
provides for governmental recovery, the majority had to determine
whether the statute contained a clear statement and an intelligible
principle.6
The NCTA clear statement doctrine states, "Congress must indicate
clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the discretionary authority
to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of
regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether
6 Id. at 167-68 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998)).
6 DuPont II, 432 F.3d at 162. The concurring opinion agreed with the majority, except for the
majority's "reliance on the 'monitoring' provision." Id. at 180. The concurrence agreed with the
government that the "oversight aspect of removal and remedial activities falls within the
description of the various activities as they are defined in .. .CERCLA § 101." Id. As a result, the
"monitoring" provision is unnecessary, and oversight costs for remedial and recovery activities are
recoverable. Id.
62 Id. at 164-66.
63 Id. at 164.
6 Id. at 166.
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characterized as 'fees' or 'taxes,' on those parties." 65 In addition to a clear
statement, Congress must also "set forth an intelligible principle to
constrain the agency."66 DuPont argued CERCLA contains neither a clear
statement nor an intelligible principle.67  The court distinguished the
DuPont II and NCTA statutory frameworks and determined that NCTA
does not govern CERCLA analysis.68  In addition, the court determined
that even if NCTA was applicable, CERCLA has its own clear statement
and intelligible principle within its cost recovery provision. As a result,
government recovery of oversight costs is authorized, though subject to
the limitations found in the terms "removal action"70 and "remedial
action"71 and the provisions of the National Contingency Plan ("NCP").72
The court found "EPA oversight falls comfortably within the
65 Id. (quoting Skinner, 490 U.S. at 224).
6 Id.
67 Id. at 167.
68 Id. The court notes NCTA dealt with user fees and a regulated industry, while CERCLA deals
with "restitutionary payments" and responsible parties. Id. at 167-68. Further, NCTA liability is
"determined by administrative levy" and CERCLA liability is "judicially determined under a
federal cause of action." Id. at 168.
69 Id.
70 "Removal actions" involve:
monitor[ing], assess[ing], and evaluat[ing] the release or threat of release of
hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other
actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public
health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release
or threat of release.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
7 "Remedial actions" involve:
those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to
removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or
future public health or welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not
limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement,
perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization,
cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials,
recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging
or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of leachate
and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of altemative water supplies,
and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the
public health and welfare and the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
72 DuPont II, 432 F.3d at 168. The NCP provides for "methods and criteria for determining the
appropriate extent of removal, remedy, and other measures." Id.
249
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definitions of 'removal action' and 'remedial action."' 73 In addition, EPA
oversight is an "enforcement activity" which is included within the terms
"removal action" and "remedial action."74 The majority also discussed
CERCLA § 107,7s which authorizes recovery of all "government costs of
monitoring, enforcement activities, and any other action necessary to
prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to
the environment." 76  The court found that this section authorizes
government recovery based on "the plain meaning of the relevant
CERCLA provisions, the overall statutory framework, the functional
benefits of agency oversight, and the overarching statutory objective of
ensuring that those responsible for environmental harm are 'tagged' with
'the cost of their actions."' 77 Therefore, the government was authorized to
recover its oversight costs from DuPont.
B. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent, conceding that NCTA should not be controlling in this
case, concluded that the government still cannot recover its oversight
costs. 79 The dissent asserts that CERCLA does not state "any intent on the
part of Congress, clear or otherwise, to allow the EPA to recover the costs
of overseeing removal or remedial actions."80  In addition, the dissent
argues that the majority mistakenly equates "government oversight" with
"monitoring," as found in the definitions of "removal action" and
"remedial action." 8' Further, even the EPA has distinguished between
oversight and performance of removal and remedial actions, and the EPA
is only allowed to recover for the actual performance of the actions, not
the oversight of the actions. 82
" Id. at 170.
7 Id. at 173-74.
7' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
76 DuPont I, 432 F.3d at 174.
" Id at 179.
78 id
7 Id. at 180.
80 Id at 182.
82 Id. at 182-83. "[T]he plain language of the definitions includes actions taken to contain and
clean up releases of hazardous waste, but not actions taken to oversee another's containment and
cleaning up of those sites." Id. at 185.
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The dissent also contends the term "enforcement activity" is an
"action taken to compel a responsible party to perform a removal or
remedial action," not an action to seek recovery of costs.83 Also, the word
"oversight" is not contained within § 107 of CERCLA; therefore,
Congress did not intend to include oversight within the activities for which
recovery is allowed.84
In addition to these arguments, the dissent contends the majority
has read CERCLA too broadly, despite the fact the Supreme Court has
urged against broad interpretations. The dissent also disagrees with the
majority's decision to give the EPA Skidmore deference in this case.
Skidmore deference is given to an agency when "its policy 'is made in
pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and
broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in
a particular case."' 87  The dissent concedes the EPA may have
"specialized experience" in CERCLA enforcement, however it notes "no
other court to consider the issue of the recoverability of oversight costs
under CERCLA has deferred to the EPA's view as a basis for its
decision."88
Finally, the dissent worries the EPA can take advantage of the
statute and recover enlarged amounts from the responsible parties. 89
CERCLA provides that if private parties choose to do so, they can
implement remedial action plans themselves.90 This allows private parties
to "control the cost of the cleanup operation within the parameters of the
plan."91 If the EPA is allowed to then bill for oversight activities after the
plan is completed, the parties are subject to unfairness and
unpredictability. 92 In addition, because the standard of review is "arbitrary
and capricious," it is too difficult for the responsible parties to prove the
83 Id.
* Id. at 185-86.
8 Id. at 189-90.
86 Id. at 187.
7 Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).




92 Id. "Allowing the EPA to bill the responsible party for its 'oversight' activities after the fact
destroys the fairness and predictability of the statutory arrangement." Id.
251
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amounts charged were too high. 93  According to the dissent's
interpretation of the statute, there is a distinction between recoverable and
non-recoverable costs that is missing from the majority's interpretation. 94
As such, the dissent finds "CERCLA does not authorize the EPA to
recover the costs of overseeing removal and remedial actions conducted
by private parties." 95
V. COMMENT
The DuPont majority determined the government was entitled to
oversight costs. However, in so deciding, the court had to reject prior case
law, including its own decision in Rohm & Haas. Part of the reason the
majority reached this conclusion is because several other circuits have
questioned the Third Circuit's holding in Rohm & Haas. The court
declined to adopt the Third Circuit's decision in Rohm & Haas and
interpreted CERCLA broadly even though the Supreme Court has urged
against broad interpretations. As noted earlier, courts tend to interpret
CERCLA broadly and liberally. However, the Supreme Court has
"emphasized that CERCLA is subject to the same canons of statutory
construction that govern all other federal statutes and cautioned lower
courts against straying too far from the statute's text."96 In utilizing their
broad interpretations, the majority and the other circuits have "ignore[d]
what the statute says in favor of a reading that comports with its view of
what the statute should do."97 If a court has guidance on an issue by way
of a statute, it should be bound by the statute not by what it thinks is the
best outcome in the situation. If it appears the statute is not providing for
the optimal outcomes, Congress is always free to amend the statute.
The majority also erred in its interpretation of the words
"oversight" and "enforcement activities." It equates "oversight" with
"monitoring" and also assumes oversight qualifies as an enforcement
activity, which is included in the definition of removal and remedial
activities. As the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted, "it does
93 Id
SId.
9 Id. at 193.
96 Id. at 189.
97 id
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not stretch or distort the meaning of the phrase to conclude that monitoring
or oversight of a private party remedial action to determine whether the
action complies with a consent decree and the provisions of CERCLA is
enforcement activity related to a remedial action."98 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has also stated, "government monitoring or oversight
is an inherent and necessary enforcement element of private party
response action." 99 As such, these circuits have seemingly employed a
liberal interpretation of CERCLA. But according to the Supreme Court,
liberal statutory interpretations are not appropriate.
A further problem with the majority opinion is that Congress does
not refer to oversight in the definition of removal. As the court points out
in Rohm & Haas:
Nowhere in the definition of removal is there an explicit
reference to oversight of activities conducted and paid for
by a private party. Nowhere is there an explicit statement
that Congress considers administrative and regulatory
costs incurred overseeing the removal and remedial
actions of a private party to be removal costs in and of
themselves. 00
Congress knew how to authorize recovery of oversight costs and chose not
to do so.o'0 For example, as the dissent notes, when Congress enacted the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA" or "SARA
Amendments") to CERCLA in 1986, it included recovery of oversight
costs in limited circumstances.1 02  One such circumstance is § 104(a),
which requires "reimbursement of costs incurred by the government
overseeing the private [Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study]."0 3
If Congress intended for the government to be able to recover oversight
costs in all circumstances, it would be unnecessary to provide for recovery
98 Id. at 185 (quoting Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1996)).
9 Id. (quoting United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399,403 (5th Cir. 1997).
100 Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1275.
101 "Given the context in which CERCLA was enacted, we find it highly significant that Congress
omitted any mention of oversight, or of government activities conducted under § 106, in the
definition of removal." Id. at 1276
102 DuPont II, 432 F.3d at 185-86.
103 Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1277.
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of oversight costs in these specific circumstances. The SARA
Amendments also now allow the government "to seek reimbursement
from the Superfund for its oversight costs in particular situations."
Again, if Congress intended for oversight costs to be readily recovered by
the government, it would not have needed to enact an amendment
providing for such recovery. As a result, the majority is not at liberty to
reach beyond congressional intent and assert that Congress intended to
authorize recovery of oversight costs.
Further, the majority has chosen to define "monitor" as monitoring
another party. The correct definition of "monitor" is the monitoring of the
release of hazardous substances. As § 104 states, "[w]here the
government takes direct action to investigate, evaluate, or monitor a
release, threat of release, or a danger posed by such a problem, the activity
is a 'removal' and its costs are recoverable." 0 5 In this section "monitor"
clearly refers to monitoring a release, threat of release, or danger.
Nowhere in the section does Congress refer to monitoring another party.
For monitoring or oversight costs to be recoverable, the costs must be
incurred by the party actually monitoring the release. The majority chose
to construe "monitor" too broadly when it determined that monitoring
applied to the monitoring of another party who monitored the release.106
Finally, another problem with the majority's analysis, as discussed
in the dissenting opinion, is that the majority is construing a statutory
provision "to allow a wholesale transfer of the expenses of operating
government to private parties where no intent to do so appears on the face
of the statute." 0 7 By allowing the EPA to recover oversight costs not
provided for in the statute, the EPA can effectively shift government
expenses to private parties. The shifting of expenses can be especially
burdensome to private parties not anticipating bearing the costs of the
governmental oversight, particularly if they do not have the funds to pay
the government. This is an example of a situation where the government
always wins. If the EPA doesn't want to pay for its own expenses, it can
" DuPont II, 432 F.3d at 187 (italics omitted).
'0 Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1278.
' "[I]f what the government is monitoring is not the release or hazard itself, by rather the
performance of a private party, the costs involved are non-recoverable oversight costs." Id. at
1279.
'0 DuPont II, 432 F.3d at 181.
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simply assert CERCLA § 107 and force a private party to pay the
expenses for it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to DuPont II, the government had not been entitled to recover
oversight costs under CERCLA § 107. The majority determined that the
government should recover its costs using a broad interpretation of
CERCLA. But as the dissent correctly points out, the Supreme Court has
urged against taking such a broad interpretation. A narrow reading of the
statute leads to the conclusion that such oversight costs are not in fact
recoverable. Despite this, the majority still allows for governmental
recovery, further proving the point that the government always wins.
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